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The Political Economy of NAFTA
Chapter Eleven: Equality Before the
Law and the Boundaries of
North American Integration
BYFREDERICK M. ABBOTT*

Today is an exciting day for NAFTA and integration specialists
for several reasons. First, the NAFTA and the process of North
American integration are raising challenging legal and social
questions that push the boundaries of international law. We certainly
hoped that the integration process would be dynamic, and the
evolution of Chapter 11 shows the NAFTA's dynamism. Second, a
number of the issues we are addressing are not squarely in the box of
matters foreseen by the drafters of the NAFTA, and are raised
because of the involvement of the private bar in implementing the
Agreement. This is a positive development. Third, we have the
honor of the presence of colleagues from Canada and Mexico, which
again demonstrates the value of the regional integration process and
expands the horizons of our knowledge.
The general subject matter of today's proceedings is the
operation of the investment chapter of the NAFTA, Chapter 11, with
particular reference to its dispute settlement mechanism. We are by
now beyond starting each NAFTA conference with an overview of
what it is and what it attempts to accomplish, and I will limit myself to
a more focused discussion of the subject matter.
NAFTA has three principal mechanisms for settling disputes,
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though if the supplemental agreements on the environment and labor
are included, then several more. The general dispute settlement
mechanism is in Chapter 20, a traditional state-to-state ad hoe
arbitration system with panel decisions referred to the Parties for
political implementation, and with the possibility that a Party may
elect to suffer the withdrawal of concessions rather than strictly
comply.
The second mechanism is the Anti-Dumping and
Countervailing Duty (AD/CVD) dispute settlement arrangement
found in Chapter 19. This mechanism is only directed to complaints
alleging a failure to correctly apply national AD/CVD law. However,
the decisions of panels are directly binding on national administrative
authorities, subject only to appeal on abuse of process grounds.
There is provision for the participation of private parties involved in
the underlying action in this procedure, though it is somewhat
indirect. The third, and the subject of today's proceedings, is the
investment dispute mechanism found in Chapter 11.
By way of historical background, the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) incorporated rules regarding foreign
direct investment that are similar to the NAFTA rules, but it did not
establish a separate dispute settlement mechanism.' In the CUSFTA,
a dispute between Canada and the United States regarding the
treatment of a private investor was to be resolved by reference to the
general dispute settlement procedure, similar to the NAFTA Chapter
20 procedure.2
The NAFTA establishes detailed rules regarding the treatment
of investors and investments of the Parties, primarily based on the
principles of national and most-favored-nation treatment, but
including specific provisions regarding matters such as preclusion of
performance requirements and ownership limitations-subject always
to the exceptions set forth in the Annexes to the Agreement. When
the basic rules of Chapter 11 and the Annexes are read together, and
in light of the general exemption for state and provincial nonconforming measures, the rules of Chapter 11 in fact become highly
complex. It is worthwhile to note, however, that Chapter 11
recognizes the right of Parties to adopt environmental regulations
1. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan 2, 1988, Can.-U.S., arts.
1608,1806-07,27 I.L.M. 281,376,384-85 [hereinafter CUSFTA].
2. Id. art. 1608. During the CUSFTA negotiations, Canada agreed to amend its
foreign investment review legislation to provide additional flexibility for U.S.
investors. Canadian decisions under this review procedure were exempted from
CUSFTA dispute resolution.
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that are consistent with the Agreement, and exhorts against
attempting to attract investment by offering to lower or waive
environmental standards. It is also critical to note that the rules of
Chapter 11 must be read in conjunction with various other parts of
the NAFTA, including, without limitation, the Technical Standards
and Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) rules, the rules regarding the
relationship of the NAFTA to other agreements, and the rules
regarding the treatment of capital movements.
Chapter 11 prohibits Parties from expropriating the investments
of investors, unless this action is taken in accordance with principles
derived from customary international law, such that the takings must
be non-discriminatory, for a public purpose, and accompanied by
effective compensation.
Pursuant to Chapter 11, private investors of Parties have the
right-though not the obligation-to pursue third party arbitration
against the host government to a NAFTA investment in the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) (including its Additional Facility) or under United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules.3 The
NAFTA obligates the Parties to make adequate provision for the
enforcement of resulting arbitral awards.4 Private persons may seek
enforcement of awards by national courts under international
agreements to which the Parties may belong.5 Note, however, that
these agreements allow some scope to national courts to refuse to
recognize and enforce awards based on considerations of overriding
public policy, so that the enforcement of an arbitral award rendered
by ICSID or under UNCITRAL rules is not automatic. An arbitral
award may provide for the payment of monetary damages or
restitution of property (which may be avoided by a Party by payment
of compensation), but it may not direct a government to amend its
legislation.7 If a Party fails to comply with an award, it is subject to

3. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA], art. 1120.
4. Id. art. 1136.
5. Id. art. 1136(6) (referring to the ICSID Convention, the New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and
the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration).
6. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, art. v (codified as 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1970)).
7. See NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1135.
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NAFTA Chapter 20 dispute settlement proceedings.8
Issues regarding the NAFTA Chapter 11 investment dispute
mechanism are part of a larger context of issues that arose in
connection with the transformation of the GATT dispute settlement
mechanism into the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, and
were reflected in the breakdown of the OECD negotiations on a
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and the Seattle
Ministerial Conference (SMC). These issues relate to multilateral
and regional governance: who is authorized to make decisions, and
how are those decisions made and carried out on behalf of
international society? In short, there are increasing public demands
for transparency, democratic representation and accountability that,
on the one side, are legitimate and useful but, on the other side, are
creating tremendous stresses on multilateral governance mechanisms.
At the moment, we are reaching something of a crisis point reflecting
the inability of governments to make and execute policy-a situation
that demands close attention and creative solutions.
The incorporation of Chapter 11 Dispute Settlement into the
NAFTA was undertaken as part of a system of investment guarantees
that Mexico anticipated would encourage foreign direct investment
(FDI) because of concerns that would reasonably be held by
prospective investors. As noted earlier, bargaining bilaterally in
CUSFTA, the United States and Canada had achieved a different
solution involving traditional state-to-state resolution of investment
disputes.
The United States has historically been very reluctant to subject
its own justice system to outside examination. This has been a major
impediment to the ratification of human rights treaties-with
particular focus on the preservation of state criminal law discretion,
as well as on vague constitutional rights deprivation fears. Had the
U.S. Congress perceived (or been advised of) any appreciable risk
that Chapter 11 would be used to address domestic regulatory
processes in a manner beyond the accepted scope of review under the
SPS and Technical Barriers provisions, it would have balked-as it
did toward even the hint of authority-in-fact over environmental
regulation (or non-regulation). I observe also that Mexico may have
constraints on its treatment of foreign investors based on its
constitution and incorporation of the Calvo doctrine.
8. Id. art. 1136(5). This may result in a recommendation that the Party comply
with the award.
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This is not to be critical of the United States, which by most
accounts would be deemed to have one of the most secure legal
systems in terms of protecting individual rights and property rights.
The fear of outside interference is not easily reconcilable with the
facts of internal U.S. adherence to good governance practices.
The tables have been turned on the United States in two
different contexts: the Loewen context in which defects in the
administration of justice are alleged, and the Methanex context in
which the fights of the states to legislate substantially unfettered from
compensatory claims are challenged in the environmental context.
Each represents a distinct challenge to traditional notions of U.S.
sovereignty, and the reaction may help to define the boundaries of
the North American integration process.
In Europe, states are routinely challenged at the regional level in
both contexts; although in Europe the willingness of states to accept
these challenges has involved an evolutionary process. Developments
in the environmental arena are chronicled in my article Regional
Integration and the Environment: The Evolution of Legal Regimes,9
and now center on the legal concept of "proportionality" of member
state legislation by which the European Court of Justice (ECJ) tests
legitimacy. In the European Union (EU), there is also a central
regulatory authority, the European Commission.
In Europe, there are frequent human rights-related challenges to
national legislation and action in the context of the Council of
Europe's European Court of Human Rights, and in certain contexts
before the ECJ.
The notion of international or regional challenge to national
government action fundamentally presupposes an adequate set of
rules by which national action may be evaluated. It may indeed be
questioned whether the NAFTA rules on the environment-or due
process-are adequate to the task they are potentially faced with
under Chapter 11. It would certainly be very unfortunate if NAFTA
rules acted as a blunt instrument by which business enterprises could
challenge environmental regulations. Moreover, it is not clear that
the rules of customary international law on expropriation are
sufficiently well evolved to address the kinds of complex claims that
might be envisioned either as due process or takings claims. Recall
that most takings adjudications have involved gross abuses and that
9. See generally Frederick M. Abbott, Regional Integration and the
Environment The Evolution of Legal Regimes, 68 CHl.-KENT L. REv. 173 (1992).
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the most extensive body of recent case law, involving the Iran Claims
Tribunal, mainly addressed clear government takings, with the legal
issues largely directed at levels of compensation.
The first wave of Chapter 11 challenges brings to mind the law of
unintended consequences, but more seriously reveals again the
benefits of granting access to legal remedies to private parties. This is
a key feature of the EU experience, in which private party action
played a critical role in developing ECJ jurisprudence across a wide
range of issues that may never have been raised-or raised much
later-by the Commission against the member states, or by memberstate-to-member-state action.
The question under NAFTA is whether we have the proper
institutions to serve the ECJ-type function. It is very questionable
whether we do. Are we comfortable with three private arbitrators
ruling on critical questions of public health, even if their decisions
only involve compensation, and not changes to legislation? I suspect
not, because there are no adequate provisions for transparency,
continuity or appellate review (except under New York Convention
public policy exceptions).
One solution to a potential Chapter 11 legitimacy problem would
be to constitute an Appellate Body composed, for example, of the
Chief Justices of the three nations' Supreme Courts. Another would
be to place greater reliance on direct NAFTA effect, and encourage
the wider participation of national courts in resolving investment
disputes. The solution does not involve placing greater authority in
the hands of executive authorities.
At the moment, if we look at the Loewen case, we take comfort
from the fact that Judge Abner Mikva, formerly of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, is sitting as the U.S. nominated
arbitrator, and such distinguished jurists certainly help to legitimize
the system. It is not clear, however, that an ad hoc approach is
adequate to satisfy what will be increasing public demands on the
system.
Ideally, NAFTA judicial bodies would cautiously evolve a
sophisticated system of jurisprudence that would serve as a guide on
investment issues; but the ICSID process, which is an ad hoc
arbitration process, is not designed for stare decisis rules.
If matters go wrong, the legislators will act-and they should.
The title of my remarks, Equality Before the Law, is intended to ask
whether the United States is prepared to accept the same types of
rules that it is willing to impose on its trading partners. Both the EU
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and the United States are having trouble digesting the consequences
of their own rule-making and dispute settlement system at the WTO.
Challenges to legitimacy are coming from a wide range of other
groups and governments. Issues are raised in the context of
democracy deficit, accountability (who elected or appointed the
decision-makers, and to whom are they accountable), and
transparency.
It may be that the good judgment of ICSID arbitrators will
sufficiently act as a barrier against over-intrusion into areas of
national regulatory discretion. The arbitrators in the DESONA case
certainly showed such good judgment. It may well be that
clarification should be made to Chapter 11 that changes in the
regulatory environment may not be challenged as expropriations, and
that challenges in the regulatory context may only be brought under
Chapter 20. It would be preferable that due process challenges be
referred to a judicial authority such as a commission of Supreme
Court Justices.
I have been a strong proponent of regional integration
undertaken with a reasonably strong institutional structure. The
NAFTA investment chapter attempted to provide financial risk
guarantees that would be attractive to the investment community, but
did not build a framework strong enough to accommodate social
policies. As such, there is a need to limit how far the scope of
investment-related review should extend until the juridical
framework of the NAFTA is made more complete.

